Question 3
The distinction between charitable trusts and non-charitable purpose trustsHarderA deed executed two years ago transferred £1 million to three trustees. The deed directs them to apply the income 'for the relief of poverty among residents of the town, and for such other purposes beneficial to the inhabitants of the town as the trustees may from time to time select'. Under the deed the trustees are to apply the income for purposes, not to distribute the fund among named persons. The town has a population of 40,000, of whom several thousand live on very low incomes. So far the trustees have spent every penny of the income on food parcels, fuel vouchers and grants to a night shelter. On two occasions they have written to local Members of Parliament supporting a bill to increase housing benefit, at negligible cost and taking very little of their time; they regard this as incidental to their relief work. None of the beneficiaries is related to the settlor or connected with any business of his. The trustees have applied to the Charity Commission for registration, which has told them that the trust as drafted cannot be registered.
Which of the following best explains why the trust cannot be registered as a charity?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer D
Correct answer
The trust's purposes are not exclusively charitable.
The second limb allows application to any purpose the trustees think beneficial to the inhabitants, which is wider than charity, so the trust is not exclusively charitable.
Registration requires a charitable purpose, public benefit and that the purposes be exclusively charitable. Relief of poverty in a town satisfies the first two, but a discretion to apply income to 'such other purposes beneficial to the inhabitants' embraces non-charitable purposes, and the trustees' actual spending cannot cure a defect in the drafting.
The second limb permits the income to be applied to any purpose the trustees consider beneficial to the inhabitants, which includes purposes that are not charitable, so the trust is not exclusively charitable however the trustees have in fact spent the money.
- Chichester Diocesan Fund and Board of Finance v Simpson [1944] AC 341 — A gift for 'charitable or benevolent' or otherwise wider beneficial purposes is not exclusively charitable and fails.
- Charities Act 2011, s.3(1)(a) — The prevention or relief of poverty is a charitable purpose.
Rule card
Charity requires all three: charitable purpose, sufficient public benefit, and exclusively charitable purposes. A limb permitting wider 'beneficial' purposes destroys the third.
Why the other options fail
- ARight outcome, wrong reason
The trustees have a discretion to select purposes, which makes the declaration of trust uncertain as to objects.
A discretion to choose among purposes is not objectionable in itself; charitable trusts routinely confer one. The problem is that the purposes the trustees may choose are not all charitable.
- Chichester Diocesan Fund and Board of Finance v Simpson [1944] AC 341 — A gift permitting application to purposes wider than charity fails as a charitable gift.
- BAdjacent rule
The class of potential beneficiaries is defined by residence in a single town, which is too narrow to be a section of the public.
A geographical class such as the residents of a town is a recognised section of the public; the defect is a personal nexus, which is absent here.
- Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 297 — The public element fails where the class is linked by a personal nexus, not where it is defined geographically.
- CAdjacent rule
The trust offends the beneficiary principle, because the income is applied for purposes rather than to individuals.
Charitable trusts are exempt from the beneficiary principle; and if the trust were exclusively charitable, applying income to purposes would be unobjectionable.
- Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522 — The beneficiary principle governs private trusts; charitable trusts are enforceable without beneficiaries.
- EAdjacent ruleClosest alternative
The trustees' correspondence with Members of Parliament is a political purpose which cannot be charitable.
Political activity is permissible if ancillary. Two letters at negligible cost, incidental to substantial relief work, would not by itself prevent registration; and registration depends on the deed's purposes, not on past activity.
Ruled out by: The letters to Members of Parliament cost negligible sums and took very little time, being incidental to substantial poverty relief, so the political element is ancillary only.
- McGovern v Attorney General [1982] Ch 321 — Political purposes are not charitable, but political activity may be ancillary to a charitable purpose.