5 single best answer questions on Tort, written to the SRA specification. Pick an answer, then open the explanation: the correct option, why each of the others fails, and the authority behind it. No sign-up.
Negligence — duty of care, breach, causation and remoteness, with psychiatric harm and pure economic loss; the defences of contributory negligence, consent and illegality; vicarious liability; occupiers' liability to visitors and non-visitors; product liability under the Consumer Protection Act 1987; private and public nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
Questions give an accident or a loss and ask whether, and how far, someone is liable. Work through the elements in order: most wrong answers are right about one element and silent about the one that fails.
Question 1
Claims for pure economic loss arising from either a negligent act or misstatementMedium
A manufacturing company was operating an electric furnace to melt metal alloys. A construction contractor negligently severed the municipal power cable supplying electricity to the company's factory. The shut-down damaged the alloy batch currently in the furnace. The factory was also unable to process four further planned batches during the twelve-hour power outage.
Which of the following best describes the losses for which the company can recover damages in negligence from the contractor?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer A+
A
Correct answer
The damaged alloy and the loss of profit on that batch only, because profit lost on the uncommenced batches is irrecoverable pure economic loss.
The company can recover for the physical damage to the alloy in the furnace and the loss of profit on that batch, but cannot recover the lost profits on the four uncommenced batches.
Under the leading authority Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27, when a negligent act cuts off power, the claimant can recover for physical damage to their own property (the alloy in the furnace) and the consequential economic loss directly flowing from that physical damage (the lost profit on that batch). However, the loss of profit from the four batches that had not yet been put into the furnace is pure economic loss resulting from an interruption of power (damage to third-party property), which is irrecoverable in tort.
Under Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co, the claimant can recover for the physical damage to its property (the alloy in the furnace) and the consequential economic loss immediately flowing from that physical damage (lost profit on that melt). However, profits on subsequent batches that were never melted are pure economic loss unconnected to damage to the claimant's property and cannot be recovered.
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 — Physical damage to goods and consequential lost profits are recoverable, but pure economic loss from lost future production batches is not.
Rule card
In negligent act claims, pure economic loss is irrecoverable. Claimants can recover for physical damage to their own property and consequential economic loss (profits directly lost from the damaged property), but not for lost profits on prospective operations prevented by the outage (Spartan Steel).
Why the other options fail
B
Adjacent ruleClosest alternative
All losses including the damaged alloy and all lost profits, because the loss of profits on the four uncommenced batches was directly caused by the physical damage to the municipal power cable.
Damage to property belonging to a third party (the power cable owned by the electricity board) does not allow the claimant to recover financial losses that do not stem from damage to its own property.
Ruled out by: The uncommenced four batches were never placed in the furnace and suffered no physical damage; their lost profits constitute pure economic loss, which Spartan Steel explicitly excludes.
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 — Financial loss resulting from damage to third-party property is pure economic loss and irrecoverable in negligence.
C
Surface reading
The damaged alloy batch only, because profits of any kind are classified as pure economic loss and are never recoverable in negligence.
Loss of profit is recoverable where it is consequential economic loss directly stemming from physical damage to the claimant's own property.
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 — Loss of profit directly consequent upon physical damage to the claimant's property is recoverable.
D
Adjacent rule
None of the losses, because the factory did not own the severed power cable and therefore suffered no actionable primary damage.
Although the claimant did not own the cable, the claimant did own the molten alloy which suffered physical damage as a direct result of the contractor's negligent act, providing an actionable foundation in negligence.
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 — A claimant who suffers physical damage to their own goods due to a severed cable can recover for that damage and its direct consequential losses.
E
Surface reading
All losses, because the interruption to production was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of severing the electricity supply line.
In claims for pure economic loss resulting from a negligent act, reasonable foreseeability alone does not establish a duty of care.
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 — Pure economic loss caused by a negligent act is not recoverable merely because it was a foreseeable result of the tort.
Question 2
Employers’ primary liability (operation and effect of the common law principles)Medium
A labourer at a scrap yard, who had sight in one eye only, was set to chip rust from steel beams. The yard, which carried compulsory employers' liability insurance, issued no goggles for chipping work, as no yard in the trade did; the chance of a fragment entering an eye during chipping was small. The labourer had never asked for goggles. A fragment struck his good eye and he is now blind.
Is the scrap yard in breach of the duty of care it owed the labourer?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer D+
D
Correct answer
Yes, because the gravity of injury to a one-eyed employee made goggles a necessary precaution.
The employer's duty is tailored to the individual employee; a known disability raises the precautions reasonable care demands.
The yard knew the labourer had one good eye, so the gravity of an eye injury to him was blindness. That gravity outweighed the low probability of a fragment striking and the absence of any trade practice of issuing goggles.
The standard of care is owed to this employee. Knowing he had one good eye, the consequence of an eye injury was total blindness, so reasonable care required goggles even though the risk was low and the trade did not supply them.
Paris v Stepney Borough Council — A known disability increasing the gravity of possible injury requires greater precautions.
Rule card
Employer's primary liability: reasonable care for the safety of each employee, judged on the likelihood of injury, the seriousness of the harm risked to that employee, and the cost and practicability of precautions. Trade practice is evidence only.
Why the other options fail
A
Right outcome, wrong reason
Yes, because an employer's duty to provide a safe workplace is strict.
The common law duty is to take reasonable care in the circumstances, not to guarantee safety.
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English — The employer's personal duty is to take reasonable care to provide competent staff, adequate plant, a safe place of work and a safe system.
B
Right outcome, wrong reason
No, because the employee never asked for goggles and the employer could rely on his silence.
The duty to take reasonable care for the employee's safety is the employer's own and is not suspended because the employee says nothing.
General Cleaning Contractors Ltd v Christmas — The employer must consider and provide a safe system; it cannot leave safety to the initiative of the workman.
C
Surface readingClosest alternative
No, because the risk of a fragment entering an eye was too small to require any precaution.
Breach is judged on magnitude of risk and gravity of the potential harm together; a small risk of total blindness justified precautions.
Ruled out by: The labourer had sight in one eye only, so the potential injury was total blindness, which outweighs the small chance of a fragment striking.
Paris v Stepney Borough Council — The seriousness of the potential injury to the individual employee is weighed with the likelihood of it occurring.
E
Adjacent rule
No, because the accepted practice in that industry was not to supply goggles for such work.
General practice is evidence of reasonable care but is not conclusive; a practice which overlooks a known special risk is no defence.
Paris v Stepney Borough Council — Common practice does not determine what reasonable care requires for an employee with a known disability.
Question 3
DefencesMedium
A customer visits an indoor shopping centre during normal trading hours to make a purchase. A maintenance cleaner mopping a polished tiled walkway near the food court leaves a large pool of soapy water across the thoroughfare without cordoning off the area. The cleaner places a single small warning cone behind a structural pillar several metres away, where it is obscured from the view of customers approaching along the main aisle.
The customer walks briskly into the area while looking down at a mobile phone screen to read an urgent email, paying no attention to the path ahead. The customer steps directly onto the soapy surface, slips, and falls heavily to the ground, sustaining a fractured elbow and torn ligaments. The customer brings a claim for damages under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. The shopping centre asserts that the warning cone absolves it from all liability.
Which of the following best explains the shopping centre's liability under the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer A+
A
Correct answer
The centre is liable for breach of duty, but damages will be reduced for contributory negligence.
The shopping centre breached its duty of care because the obscured warning was inadequate to make the customer reasonably safe, but the customer's damages will be reduced for contributory negligence.
Under s.2(4)(a) of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, a warning does not absolve the occupier unless in all the circumstances it was enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe. An obscured cone behind a pillar where visitors cannot see it is inadequate, so the centre breached its common duty of care. However, the customer was walking briskly whilst reading a phone and not looking at the walkway. This constitutes a failure to take reasonable care for their own safety, entitling the centre to a reduction of damages for contributory negligence under s.1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
Under s.2(4)(a) of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, a warning does not absolve the occupier unless it was enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe; an obscured cone behind a pillar is inadequate. However, the customer failed to take reasonable care for their own safety by walking briskly while looking only at a phone, so damages are reduced for contributory negligence under s.1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, s.2(4)(a) — A warning is not to be treated without more as absolving the occupier from liability, unless in all the circumstances it was enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe.
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s.1(1) — Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person, damages recoverable shall be reduced.
Rule card
OLA 1957 s.2(4)(a): A warning only absolves an occupier if it enables the visitor to be reasonably safe. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945: Visitor's carelessness reduces damages.
Why the other options fail
B
Surface reading
The centre is not liable, because placing a recognized warning cone on the premises discharges the common duty of care to visitors regardless of its location.
Section 2(4)(a) of the 1957 Act expressly states that a warning is not to be treated without more as absolving the occupier unless in all the circumstances it was enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe. A hidden cone is ineffective.
Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, s.2(4)(a) — A warning is not without more to be treated as absolving the occupier unless in all the circumstances it was enough to enable the visitor to be reasonably safe.
C
Surface reading
The centre is fully liable without any reduction, because visitors are not required to guard against liquid spillages inside commercial shopping centres.
Visitors are required to take reasonable care for their own safety. Walking while looking down at a phone screen constitutes contributory negligence, reducing damages.
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s.1(1) — Where a claimant's own fault contributed to their injury, their damages must be reduced.
D
Adjacent ruleClosest alternative
The centre is not liable, because the customer voluntarily assumed the risk of falling by walking whilst distracted.
Volenti non fit injuria (s.2(5) OLA 1957) requires full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk and a free agreement to run it. The distracted customer was unaware of the puddle and did not consent to the risk of falling.
Ruled out by: Eliminated because volenti non fit injuria (s.2(5)) requires full knowledge and voluntary agreement to incur the legal risk; careless distraction constitutes contributory negligence, not consent.
Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, s.2(5) — The common duty of care does not impose an obligation in respect of risks willingly accepted by the visitor.
E
Adjacent rule
The centre is not liable, because the customer's failure to look where they were walking broke the chain of causation.
A claimant's own negligence does not break the chain of causation unless it is so unreasonable and unforeseeable as to eclipse the defendant's breach entirely. Walking while distracted is a foreseeable form of carelessness that reduces damages under contributory negligence rather than breaking causation.
Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1404 — A claimant's own careless conduct will not break the chain of causation unless it is so unreasonable as to eclipse the defendant's wrongdoing, and is otherwise addressed by contributory negligence.
Question 4
Principles of the Consumer Protection Act 1987Easier
A homeowner bought a washing machine manufactured by an appliance company. Due to a manufacturing defect in the internal drum, the machine malfunctioned and destroyed itself. No other property was damaged, and nobody was injured. The homeowner seeks compensation under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 for the machine.
Can the homeowner recover the cost of replacing the washing machine under the Consumer Protection Act 1987?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer E+
E
Correct answer
No, because the Act does not cover loss of or damage to the defective product itself.
Under s.5(2) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, damage to the defective product itself is not recoverable.
The Consumer Protection Act 1987 provides compensation for death, personal injury, and damage to other private property. Under s.5(2), liability under section 2 does not arise in respect of loss of or damage to the product itself. Therefore, the homeowner cannot recover the replacement cost of the washing machine under the Act.
Section 5(2) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 explicitly provides that 'damage' does not include the loss of or damage to the product itself. Remedy for the defective product itself lies in contract (e.g. against the seller under the Consumer Rights Act 2015).
Consumer Protection Act 1987, s.5(2) — Damage under the Act excludes loss of or damage to the product itself.
Rule card
CPA 1987 s.5(2): Damage under the Act does NOT include loss of or damage to the defective product itself. Remedy for the item itself lies in contract against the seller.
Why the other options fail
A
Surface readingClosest alternative
Yes, because the washing machine is private domestic property and its replacement cost exceeds the statutory minimum threshold of £275.
Although the washing machine is domestic property and its value exceeds £275 (the threshold in s.5(4)), s.5(2) of the CPA 1987 expressly provides that a person shall not be liable under s.2 for loss of or damage to the product itself.
Ruled out by: The statutory exclusion in s.5(2) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, which overrides the general property threshold.
Consumer Protection Act 1987, s.5(2), s.5(4) — Damage under the Act excludes loss of or damage to the product itself, regardless of whether property exceeds £275.
B
Adjacent rule
Yes, because the Act imposes strict liability for loss of or damage to any property caused by a defect in a product.
While s.5(1) defines damage as including loss of or damage to any property, this is expressly made subject to the subsequent provisions of s.5. Section 5(2) explicitly provides that there is no liability under s.2 for loss of or damage to the product itself.
Consumer Protection Act 1987, s.5(1)-(2) — The statutory definition of damage to property in s.5(1) is subject to the express exclusion of the product itself in s.5(2).
C
Adjacent rule
No, because statutory claims for defective goods must be brought against the immediate seller rather than the manufacturer.
Under s.2(2) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987, strict liability is imposed directly on the producer (manufacturer) of the product without requiring privity of contract. The claim fails instead because s.5(2) excludes liability for loss of or damage to the product itself.
Consumer Protection Act 1987, s.2(2) — Liability under the Act is imposed directly on the producer of the defective product rather than exclusively on the immediate supplier.
D
Adjacent rule
No, because the homeowner must prove that the appliance company was negligent in manufacturing the washing machine.
Liability under s.2(1) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 is strict and does not require proof that the manufacturer was negligent. The claim fails instead because s.5(2) excludes liability for loss of or damage to the product itself.
Consumer Protection Act 1987, s.2(1) — Liability under the Act is strict upon proof of a defect causing damage and does not require proof of negligence.
Question 5
The rule in Rylands v FletcherMedium
A local authority owns a multi-storey block of residential flats. It maintains a large cold-water storage tank and piping system in the roof space to supply domestic drinking water to the residents. Without any negligence by the local authority, a supply pipe unexpectedly fractured. A torrent of water escaped, flooding the basement of an adjoining commercial shop. The shopkeeper brings an action under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
Which of the following statements best explains whether the local authority is liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer B+
B
Correct answer
Not liable because supplying domestic water to residential flats does not constitute a non-natural use of land.
The local authority is not liable under Rylands v Fletcher because maintaining a domestic water supply system is a normal and ordinary use of land, not a non-natural use.
Under Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 66, the requirement of 'non-natural use' requires an extraordinary and unusual use of land creating an exceptionally high risk. Piping water for ordinary domestic consumption to a block of flats is a completely ordinary and standard use of land. Because the use is natural/ordinary, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher cannot apply.
In Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 66, the House of Lords held that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher requires an extraordinary and unusual use of land that poses an exceptionally high risk of danger. The provision of a piped water supply for normal domestic use to a block of flats is an entirely ordinary, routine, and natural use of land.
Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 66 — Domestic water piping to residential flats is an ordinary use of land, not a non-natural use under Rylands v Fletcher.
Rule card
For Rylands v Fletcher, the use of land must be non-natural (extraordinary and unusual). Supplying piped domestic water to domestic flats is an ordinary use (Transco v Stockport MBC).
Why the other options fail
A
Surface reading
Liable because the rule in Rylands v Fletcher imposes strict liability whenever an escape of water collected on land causes foreseeable damage.
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher requires a 'non-natural use' of land; collecting water for ordinary domestic supply is a natural and ordinary use.
Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 66 — Supplying water for ordinary domestic purposes through a piping system does not constitute a non-natural use of land.
C
Surface reading
Liable because storing a substantial volume of water in a roof space is an inherently dangerous non-natural activity.
Piping and tanks used to service domestic water needs in residential buildings are an ordinary and conventional feature of modern living, not a non-natural use.
Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 66 — Standard water tanks and pipes for domestic residential supply are not non-natural uses of land.
D
Right outcome, wrong reasonClosest alternative
Not liable because the local authority took all reasonable care and was not negligent.
Rylands v Fletcher is a strict liability tort. If the elements were met, absence of negligence would not be a defence; liability fails instead on the non-natural use element.
Ruled out by: The fact that Rylands v Fletcher is a strict liability tort where lack of negligence is not a valid defence.
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 — Liability under the rule is strict once the elements of non-natural use and dangerous escape are satisfied.
E
Outdated law
Not liable because pure water is incapable of being a dangerous thing.
Water can be a dangerous thing if accumulated in bulk under extraordinary conditions (as in Rylands v Fletcher itself); the issue here is non-natural use.
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 — Water accumulated in an artificial reservoir can satisfy the dangerous thing element.
Where candidates lose marks in Tort
Remoteness asks whether the kind of damage was foreseeable, not its extent or the exact way it happened (The Wagon Mound (No 1); Hughes v Lord Advocate).
The Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 protects non-visitors against personal injury only; damage to their property is not covered (s 1(8)).
Contributory negligence reduces damages to the extent the court thinks just (Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s 1); it never defeats the claim outright.