5 single best answer questions on Legal System, written to the SRA specification. Pick an answer, then open the explanation: the correct option, why each of the others fails, and the authority behind it. No sign-up.
The legal system of England and Wales — the courts, the judiciary, precedent and statutory interpretation — together with constitutional and administrative law: the institutions of the state, parliamentary sovereignty and privilege, the prerogative and conventions, legislation at Westminster and in the Senedd, judicial review, the Human Rights Act 1998 and public order law, and the place of EU-derived law in the UK constitution.
The rules here are finite and they do not change from question to question, which makes it the cheapest subject in FLK1 to secure — and the one most often left until the last week.
Question 1
Thejudicial functionjudiciaryHarder
The head of the judiciary of England and Wales is considering three proposals. The first is a new programme of specialist training for judges hearing complex fraud trials; the programme would require substantial additional expenditure, and the Ministry of Justice has indicated that the budget allocated to judicial training cannot be increased this year. The second is the transfer of two circuit judges from one court centre to another to reduce a backlog of cases. The third is that he should himself sit for a week in the county court to hear a substantial contract claim. A solicitor is asked to advise.
Which of the following statements best describes the position?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer C+
C
Correct answer
The Lord Chief Justice is responsible for judicial training arrangements, but only within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor.
Responsibility for judicial training rests with the Lord Chief Justice, but it is a resource-limited responsibility.
Under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 the Lord Chief Justice, as President of the Courts of England and Wales and Head of the Judiciary, is responsible for maintaining appropriate arrangements for the welfare, training and guidance of the judiciary — expressly within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor. He is also responsible for deployment and allocation of work, and is entitled to sit in the county court.
This states both limbs of the statutory responsibility: the head of the judiciary maintains the arrangements, but only to the extent of the resources the Lord Chancellor provides.
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.7(2)(b) — The Lord Chief Justice is responsible for maintaining appropriate arrangements for the welfare, training and guidance of the judiciary within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor.
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.7(4) — The courts of which the Lord Chief Justice is president include the county court.
Rule card
CRA 2005 s.7: LCJ is Head of the Judiciary and President of the Courts of England and Wales; responsible for (a) representing judicial views to Parliament and Ministers, (b) welfare, training and guidance arrangements within the Lord Chancellor's resources, (c) deployment and allocation of work; entitled to sit in the listed courts.
Why the other options fail
A
Right outcome, wrong reason
The Lord Chancellor, and not the Lord Chief Justice, is responsible for the training of the judiciary, because he makes the resources available.
Providing the resources is not the same as holding the responsibility: the statute places responsibility for maintaining training arrangements on the Lord Chief Justice, while the Lord Chancellor makes resources available.
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.7(2)(b) — The Lord Chief Justice is responsible for the maintenance of appropriate arrangements for the welfare, training and guidance of the judiciary within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor.
B
Adjacent rule
Transferring judges between court centres is a matter for the Lord Chancellor alone.
Deployment of the judiciary and the allocation of work within courts are the responsibility of the Lord Chief Justice, not the Lord Chancellor.
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.7(2)(c) — The Lord Chief Justice is responsible for the maintenance of appropriate arrangements for the deployment of the judiciary and the allocation of work within courts.
D
Surface readingClosest alternative
The Lord Chief Justice is responsible for the training of the judiciary, and that responsibility is unaffected by any limit placed on the available budget.
The first half is right, but the duty is expressly limited to the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor, so a budget limit does bear on what arrangements can be maintained.
Ruled out by: The scenario states that the programme needs substantial additional expenditure and that the allocated training budget cannot be increased; the statutory responsibility is exercisable only within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor, so the budget limit is not irrelevant.
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.7(2)(b) — The responsibility for training arrangements is expressed to be within the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor.
E
Adjacent rule
The Lord Chief Justice may not sit in the county court, because the county court is not one of the Senior Courts.
It is true that the county court is not a Senior Court, but the Lord Chief Justice is president of the county court and is entitled to sit in it.
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.7(3)–(4) — The President of the Courts of England and Wales is president of the listed courts, which include the county court, and is entitled to sit in any of them.
Senior Courts Act 1981, s.1 — The Senior Courts consist of the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Crown Court.
Question 2
Court hierarchy, the appeal systemand jurisdictionMedium
A company lost a claim tried in the Chancery Division of the High Court. The judge's decision turned entirely on the construction of a section of a recent taxation statute, an issue on which businesses across the country urgently need a ruling. The company's solicitor wants the matter resolved by the Supreme Court as quickly as possible.
Which of the following best describes the availability of an appeal direct from the High Court to the Supreme Court?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer A+
A
Correct answer
Such an appeal is possible only where the trial judge grants a certificate on a point of law of general public importance and the Supreme Court grants permission to appeal.
A leapfrog appeal from the High Court to the Supreme Court requires both a certificate from the trial judge and permission from the Supreme Court.
Under sections 12 and 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 (as amended), an appeal may bypass the Court of Appeal and proceed direct from the High Court to the Supreme Court ('leapfrog') only if two statutory requirements are met. First, the trial judge must grant a certificate indicating that the decision involves a point of law of general public importance (here relating wholly or mainly to the construction of an enactment). Second, following the grant of the certificate, the Supreme Court must grant permission to appeal.
A leapfrog appeal from the High Court to the Supreme Court under the Administration of Justice Act 1969 requires two cumulative steps: the trial judge must grant a certificate confirming that the statutory conditions are satisfied (here, a point of law of general public importance relating to statutory construction), and the Supreme Court must subsequently grant permission to appeal.
Administration of Justice Act 1969, s. 12 — The trial judge may grant a certificate where a point of law of general public importance relates wholly or mainly to the construction of an enactment.
Administration of Justice Act 1969, s. 13 — Where a certificate is granted under section 12, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court only if the Supreme Court grants permission to appeal.
Rule card
Leapfrog appeals (High Court to Supreme Court): requires (1) a certificate from the trial judge on a point of law of general public importance (relating to statutory construction or binding appellate precedent) and (2) permission to appeal granted by the Supreme Court (Administration of Justice Act 1969, ss. 12–13).
Why the other options fail
B
Adjacent rule
Such an appeal is possible only if the Court of Appeal first grants permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeal does not grant permission for a leapfrog appeal; the procedure bypasses the Court of Appeal entirely, and an application for permission must be made directly to the Supreme Court.
Administration of Justice Act 1969, s. 13(1) — An application for permission to appeal direct to the Supreme Court is determined by the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeal.
C
Adjacent rule
Such an appeal is not available because leapfrog appeals are restricted to cases where the judge was bound by a precedent of the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court.
Under section 12(3) of the Administration of Justice Act 1969, leapfrog appeals are not restricted to cases involving binding precedent; a point of law of general public importance relating wholly or mainly to statutory construction provides an independent alternative ground.
Administration of Justice Act 1969, s. 12(3) — A certificate may be granted if the point of law of general public importance relates wholly or mainly to the construction of an enactment, as an alternative to involving a binding appellate precedent.
D
Adjacent ruleClosest alternative
The trial judge may certify the appeal to the Supreme Court, and no further permission is then needed.
The trial judge's certificate does not dispense with the requirement to obtain permission to appeal; under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969, permission must still be sought from and granted by the Supreme Court.
Ruled out by: The trial judge's certificate is a necessary gateway, but it does not dispense with the requirement to obtain permission to appeal from the Supreme Court.
Administration of Justice Act 1969, s. 13(1) — A certificate granted by the trial judge does not dispense with the requirement to apply for and obtain permission to appeal from the Supreme Court.
E
Outdated law
Such an appeal is possible only if all parties to the claim consent to the application to bypass the Court of Appeal.
Under section 12(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 (as amended by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015), an application for a certificate may be made by any party to the proceedings; the consent of all parties is no longer mandatory.
Administration of Justice Act 1969, s. 12(1) — An application for a leapfrog certificate may be made by any of the parties to the proceedings.
Question 3
Parliamentary privilegeMedium
During a debate in the House of Commons a Member of Parliament states that a construction company won a public contract by bribing officials. The company denies this. The following day the Member issues a press release to national newspapers repeating the allegation word for word, and says publicly that she is willing to defend her allegation in court. The company's solicitor has written to the Speaker asking the House of Commons to permit a defamation claim. In the same week a different Member is charged with dishonestly claiming parliamentary expenses.
Which of the following statements about parliamentary privilege is correct on these facts?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer E+
E
Correct answer
The words spoken in the debate cannot be questioned in the claim, but the press release repeating them is actionable.
Privilege protects proceedings in Parliament, not the Member's extra-parliamentary repetition of the same words.
The debate is a proceeding in Parliament and cannot be questioned in litigation; the press release is a fresh publication outside Parliament and is actionable in the ordinary way.
Freedom of speech in Parliament prevents the court examining what was said in debate; the separate publication to newspapers is outside proceedings and may be sued upon.
Church of Scientology of California v Johnson-Smith [1972] 1 QB 522 — Privilege covers words spoken in debate but not their repetition outside Parliament.
Freedom of speech in Parliament bars the courts from questioning proceedings in Parliament. It belongs to the House, cannot be waived by a member, and does not cover repetition outside the House or expenses claims.
Why the other options fail
A
Right outcome, wrong reason
The Member may waive privilege, so the claim can be brought on the words spoken in the debate.
The privilege of freedom of speech belongs to the House, not to the individual Member, and cannot be waived by her willingness to litigate.
Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321 — The privilege protecting parliamentary proceedings is that of the House and is not at the disposal of an individual member.
B
Adjacent ruleClosest alternative
Privilege covers both the debate and the press release, because both concern the Member's parliamentary work.
Privilege attaches to proceedings in Parliament, not to the Member wherever she speaks; a press release to newspapers is not a proceeding, and repetition outside the House is actionable.
Ruled out by: The allegation was repeated in a press release issued to national newspapers, which is not a proceeding in Parliament however closely it tracks the debate.
Church of Scientology of California v Johnson-Smith [1972] 1 QB 522 — Freedom of speech in Parliament protects proceedings in Parliament; statements repeated outside Parliament are not protected.
C
Adjacent rule
The claim may proceed on the debate only if the House of Commons resolves to permit it.
The courts will not question proceedings in Parliament; no resolution of the House converts a debate into evidence founding a defamation claim.
Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321 — Courts will not allow parliamentary statements to be questioned in litigation, irrespective of the parties' or the House's wishes.
D
Surface reading
Privilege would equally prevent the prosecution of the other Member for dishonest expenses claims.
Submitting expenses claims is not a proceeding in Parliament, so privilege does not bar criminal prosecution of the Member.
R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52 — Claims for parliamentary expenses are not proceedings in Parliament and are not protected by privilege.
Question 4
RemediesMedium
A market trader applied to a local authority for a street trading licence. The committee refused the application without considering his previous trading record, as the authority's own published policy required. The trader lost £12,000 of expected profits over the following season. The authority now accepts that its committee failed to follow that policy. The trader issues judicial review proceedings promptly, wanting to trade again this year. The licensing decision remains one for the authority's committee under the governing legislation.
Which of the following best describes the relief the court may grant?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer A+
A
Correct answer
A quashing order setting aside the refusal and remitting the application to the authority for lawful reconsideration.
The appropriate relief is to quash the refusal and send the application back for lawful reconsideration.
The committee failed to apply its own policy, so the decision may be quashed; but the licensing discretion remains the committee's under the governing legislation, so the court remits rather than decides.
The supervisory jurisdiction allows the court to quash an unlawful decision and require the decision to be retaken lawfully by the body entrusted with it.
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 — Review concerns the legality and manner of decision-making, not the merits.
R v Aston University Senate, ex p Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538 — Remedies are discretionary.
Rule card
Judicial review remedies: quashing, prohibiting and mandatory orders, declarations and injunctions, all discretionary; the court supervises and remits, and damages require an independent private law cause of action.
Why the other options fail
B
Right outcome, wrong reason
The court must grant relief as of right, since the authority has conceded that its committee acted unlawfully.
Remedies in judicial review are discretionary; the court may refuse or limit relief even where a ground is established.
R v Aston University Senate, ex p Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538 — Relief in the supervisory jurisdiction is discretionary and may be refused notwithstanding established unlawfulness.
C
Civil-law intuition
Damages for the £12,000 lost profits, because the decision is admitted to be unlawful.
There is no general right to damages for unlawful administrative action; a separate private law cause of action, such as misfeasance in public office, must be established.
Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 — Compensation for unlawful public administration requires a recognised cause of action such as misfeasance in public office.
D
Surface readingClosest alternative
The court may substitute its own decision and grant the licence, the unlawfulness being admitted.
The court's jurisdiction is supervisory; it does not exercise the licensing discretion conferred on the committee.
Ruled out by: The governing legislation leaves the licensing decision to the authority's committee, so the court cannot substitute its own decision.
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 — The supervisory jurisdiction does not permit the court to decide the matter afresh.
E
Adjacent rule
A mandatory order requiring the authority to issue the licence to the trader without further consideration.
A mandatory order compels performance of a public duty; it cannot dictate how a genuine discretion is exercised.
Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 — The court may compel lawful consideration but not a particular exercise of discretion.
Question 5
Schedule 1 HRA 1998 the "Convention Rights"Medium
A woman brings proceedings in the High Court against a local authority. She complains that its conduct towards her showed discrimination on grounds of her religion, that it interfered with respect for her family life, and that it interfered with the peaceful enjoyment of her land. She also contends that the authority denied her any effective remedy, relying on Article 13 of the Convention. She seeks damages for the infringement. Her statement of case asserts that the Convention in its entirety forms part of the law of England and Wales. The authority's letter in reply refers to a designated reservation and denies that she has any enforceable rights.
Which of the following best describes whether the Articles on which the woman relies are "Convention rights" for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Show the answer and explanationAnswer A+
A
Correct answer
Article 13 is not one of the Convention rights, but Article 14 and Article 1 of the First Protocol are.
The Act incorporates a defined list of Articles; Article 13 is not on it, while Article 14 and the First Protocol rights are.
Section 1(1) defines the Convention rights as Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol and Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to 18, and those Articles are set out in Schedule 1. The claim based on Article 13 therefore cannot be advanced as a Convention right.
The Act defines the Convention rights as Articles 2 to 12 and 14, Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol and Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol; Article 13 is omitted.
Human Rights Act 1998, s.1(1) — Definition of "the Convention rights" by reference to specified Articles and Protocols.
Human Rights Act 1998, s.1(3) — Those Articles are set out in Schedule 1.
Rule card
Convention rights under the Act: Convention Articles 2–12 and 14; First Protocol Articles 1–3; Thirteenth Protocol Article 1 — subject to any designated derogation or reservation.
Why the other options fail
B
Surface reading
All the Articles of the Convention and of every Protocol ratified by the United Kingdom are Convention rights, because Schedule 1 sets out the Convention in full.
The Act incorporates only the listed Articles; the definition is selective, and Article 13 in particular is not included.
Human Rights Act 1998, s.1(1) — The Convention rights are confined to the Articles specifically listed in section 1(1).
C
Adjacent ruleClosest alternative
Article 13, the right to an effective remedy, is a Convention right, since the Act empowers courts to award damages for infringement.
The availability of remedies under the Act does not incorporate Article 13, which is deliberately absent from the definition of the Convention rights.
Ruled out by: Article 13 is outside the list in section 1(1); the fact that she seeks damages under the Act does not bring the effective remedy Article into domestic law.
Human Rights Act 1998, s.1(1)(a) — The Convention Articles incorporated are Articles 2 to 12 and 14, so Article 13 is not a Convention right.
D
Right outcome, wrong reason
None of the rights relied on has effect, because of the designated reservation.
The Articles have effect subject to any designated derogation or reservation, but a reservation limits only the Article to which it relates; it does not remove the Convention rights generally.
Human Rights Act 1998, s.1(2) — The Articles have effect for the purposes of the Act subject to any designated derogation or reservation.
E
Adjacent rule
Only Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention are Convention rights; the rights in the First Protocol are not incorporated by the Act.
Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol are expressly included in the definition of the Convention rights.
Human Rights Act 1998, s.1(1)(b) — Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol are Convention rights for the purposes of the Act.
Where candidates lose marks in Legal System
Only the ratio of a case binds. A remark made in passing is obiter and at most persuasive, however senior the judge who made it.
Where a statute cannot be read compatibly with a Convention right (Human Rights Act 1998, s 3), a higher court may make a declaration of incompatibility (s 4) — which leaves the statute fully in force.
A claim for judicial review must be brought promptly and in any event within three months of the grounds arising (CPR 54.5).